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 Issues that are prominent within the anti-Muslim hate discourse that pervaded Sri Lanka in recent years are the speed at which the Muslim community is increasing its 
numbers—they are said to become a majority in a few decades; as well as Muslim 
women’s dress- the hijab nikab and abhaya. Certain Muslim interlocutors’ own 
responses have included defending the hijab as protecting women from violence, 
and urging that the state institute measures to increase the Sinhalese population. 
Ironically the latter was also the position of the Bodu Bala Sena the group 
propagating anti- Muslim sentiment; and the government responded to the position 
and institutionalized it by way of a health ministry circular banning NGO programs in 
reproductive health. I look at the manner in which gender orders became 
reorganized in the aftermath of the state’s military victory over the rebel group the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009 as a consequence of militarism. This 
reordering is reflected both in the anti Muslim rhetoric and the rolling back of 
important women friendly policies in the country. Writing on women’s experiences in 
Sri Lanka, however look mainly at the experiences of particular ethnic communities 
at the expense of a collective narrative of exclusion exploitation and misogyny. 
Exploring these developments this paper will also speculate as to why it is difficult to 
think outside the ethnic frames to understand the gendered nature of the post war 
moment. 
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s has now been well documented, 
the Bodu Bala Sena, an 
organization comprising mostly 
of nationalist monks began a sustained anti 
minority campaign in post war Sri Lanka, 
and their minority of choice were the 
Muslims. In this paper I am going to argue 
that the BBS attacks against Muslims were 
a deeply masculinist onslaught that 
targeted minority Muslims but also had 
scant regard for women of any ethnicity.  I 
will also argue that the Muslim response 
was similarly masculinist but drew instead 
from a set of ideas that resonated with but 
were different from those of the Sinhala 
supremacists. This collective of monks, 
some of whom have been active in 
nationalistic agitations for years, registered 
itself as an organization in May 2012.1 
From the time of its registration onwards 
the group expanded its arena of activities 
through social media, press conferences, 
prime time television coverage and by 
virtue of massive rallies in various parts of 
the Island. The member monks have also 
claimed that they have the best network in 
the country given the many temples all 
over the island, the number of times the 
monks engage with the laity, in the temple, 
at alms-giving of different sorts, Sunday 
school etc. They in fact threatened at a 
press conference to mobilize this network 
to boycott food labelled as halal if the 
labelling process was not done away with 
by a date that they specified.2 The reach of 
their message and the power of their 
rhetoric was such that they were successful 
in getting the halal labeling process 
suspended from local grocery shelves 
                                                
1 It has one public lay member – the secretary.   
2 BoduBalaSena press conference 19/11/2012(find 
you tube link reference) 
indefinitely. (Haniffa forthcoming) The 
BBS ideology seemed to find 
overwhelming endorsement among the 
Sinhala public.3 The kind of media 
attention and coverage that it received for 
a brief period in Early 2013 and the 
reluctance of mainstream media to carry 
any voice that was oppositional to the 
rhetoric, was an indication of how much 
support the ideology suddenly seemed to 
have garnered among the Sinhala masses 
of different classes.  
The political context shifted after the 
Presidential elections of January 2015 and 
by July 2015 the mood in the country was 
different; the monks’ rhetoric has 
dissipated somewhat, and while the groups 
continue to exist and a variety of incidents 
of harassment get reported, the frenzied 
snowballing of the sentiment everywhere, 
the constant threat of violence and the 
Muslims’ sense of distress due to this has 
abated. The spewing of anti Muslim 
rhetoric, the sporadic violent events 
throughout the Sinhala speaking areas of 
the country, and ultimately the 
orchestrated anti Muslim violence of June 
2014 occurred without substantial 
comment or criticism on the part of the 
state, or indeed any institutional measures 
against the perpetrators.  
I have argued elsewhere that the BBS 
emerged in the wake of the military defeat 
of the LTTE, and the popular and regime 
driven endorsement of the untra-nationalist 
stance of monk-led nationalist politics in 
                                                
3 Anti Muslim sentiment has been mobilized 
periodically in Sri Lanka by various forces. For an 
examination of one of the first instances of anti- 
Muslim mobilization in the post-war context see 
Heslop’s exploration of the case of the Dambulla 
mosque (2014).  
A 
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the country (Haniffa 2015).  The ideology 
that saw the violent decimation of the 
Tamil minority representatives to 
safeguard the unitary nature of the Sri 
Lankan state also saw the emergence of a 
frenzied quest for the polities’ next 
enemies. This Sinhala supremacist 
nationalism took no time to identify the 
Muslim as the next threat to be addressed.4  
This paper deals with an element of that 
nationalism that bares substantial scrutiny: 
its position on women. 
This paper will look specifically at the 
gendered elements of the hate rhetoric, the 
gendered nature of the responses that such 
attention garnered and the kind of feminist 
concerns that informed the ethico-political 
questions that emerged for activists 
responding to the problem. Fecund Mullas, 
or sexually predatory and aggressive 
Muslim males were a main element of the 
hate rhetoric, as were the gonibillas—
Muslim women dressed in black hijab and 
abhaya with their faces covered.  The BBS 
and its allies were extraordinarily 
preoccupied with what they claimed was 
the increase in the Muslim population, and 
the rate at which Muslims were 
procreating, and the fact that there are 
Sinhala women marrying Muslim men and 
converting to Islam. At the same time, 
they were also extremely concerned with 
the “Arabized” dress of Muslim women – 
specifically the women wearing the niqab 
or face covering that they have often 
termed “gonibilla.” The Gonibilla is the 
“monster” figure of the Sinhala language 
used to scare children.  It is also associated 
                                                
4 This is not to say that Muslims were only then 
being discovered as a suitable other. In fact, 
anthropologists had noted, colonial commentators 
had claimed that the Muslim was the hated other of 
the Sinhalese peasant   
with the figure of the informant who was 
responsible for naming terrorists (either of 
the JVP or the LTTE) during political 
crises. Men (generally) wearing a gunny 
sack or a “goni” over their heads with 
holes to see with, pointed out those who 
were against the government, or against 
the rebels as the case may be; those who 
were thus identified were invariably shot 
or disappeared.   
Together with the intense 
militarization during and after the conflict 
in the country, the valourising of a 
combative masculinity happened in a 
manner that concomitantly trivialized 
women and standardized particular ideas 
regarding women’s social roles.  
Immediate post-war Sri Lanka experienced 
a significant recalibration of gender orders. 
As Kodikara documented, the post-war 
plans for development and progress have 
been particularly problematic. Institutional 
reforms, and women centered assistance 
has been designed in relation to very 
specific ideas regarding masculinity and 
femininity. For instance, attributing 
teenage pregnancies, high school drop out 
rates and childhood drug use to mothers 
leaving the country as domestic workers, 
and the president committing to overturn 
hard won domestic violence legislation on 
the basis that it was leading to a higher 
divorce rate are two examples of such 
thinking that naturalizes women’s care 
giving roles together with violence within 
marriages.  Controlling women’s mobility 
for work through administrative strictures, 
beauty culture training for female LTTE 
cadres, and prohibiting non- state agencies 
from working on reproductive health 
issues have been among the institutional 
consequences of these ideals regarding 
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masculinity and femininity in post war Sri 
Lanka (Kodikara 2014). 
The anxieties spawned by the end of 
the war were managed and articulated in a 
variety of ways. There was a widespread 
referencing of enemies to the Sinhala 
nation – that Muslims were engaged in a 
conspiracy to end the majority status of the 
Sinhalese. The BBS monks stated that if 
the war had ended ten years later than it 
did, the end of the war would have been 
celebrated not by a Sinhala country but by 
a Muslim one.5 They thanked Rajapaksha 
for ending that war in order that this new 
enemy –the Muslim--could be identified 
and dealt with.  Sinhalese that did not 
support the post-war effort to identify this 
enemy were themselves called “Muslim” 
with veiled reference to circumcision as 
emasculation.  One element not addressed 
in Enloe’s schematic but I will show was 
present in post-war Sri Lanka was also the 
issue of sexual violence.  
The coming together of persistence 
militarism and particular gender relations 
in situations of post war transition have 
had serious consequences for women in 
the contexts that Enloe references (Enloe 
219). In Sri Lanka too, I contend that the 
emergence of the ideology of the BBS and 
concomitant Sinhala supremacy indexes 
the entrenching of a militarist ideology and 
anxieties about ethnic and gender 
relations.  
In her discussion on feminism after 
wars, Enloe references the Women’s War 
Museum in Ho Chi Min city, Vietnam.  
                                                





The museum is unusual in that it captures 
the contribution that women made to the 
glorious victories in wars fought by the 
Vietnamese forces and glorifies women’s 
roles as carriers of messages, and food, 
and also as competent combatants famed 
for their skills in shooting down American 
warplanes. However, Enloe also points out 
one other interesting aspect of the 
Museum. The statue of the combatant who 
shoots down planes portrays her as holding 
her baby while shooting down the plane.  
The exhibit also includes examples of 
exquisite needlework produced during the 
conflict by women in prisons. The 
museum does not include reference to 
other roles played by women as nurses or 
prostitutes or even as people who did not 
have an informed critical stance towards 
the war’s politics but carried on everyday 
life in a time of great difficulty. Enloe calls 
attention to the fact that these 
juxtapositions of women’s traditional roles 
with what is understood as war time state 
of exception speaks to a larger concern 
that haunts post war contexts—the 
restoration of  (gender)order in the 
aftermath of war.  As has been extensively 
documented from the context of both 
World War II and the Algerian war of 
liberation for instance, women are 
expected to resume more traditional 
gender identities in the post war context 
and moreover, participate in the post war 
recovery through providing unnamed but 
gendered caring and counseling services to 
returning family members.  
This valorizing of maleness in post war 
Sri Lanka must be understood not just in 
gendered but also ethnicised terms. Given 
that the end of the war came about by a 
military victory for the Sri Lankan army, 
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which by then was almost completely 
Sinhalese with some limited numbers of 
Tamils and Muslims in its ranks, the 
Sinhala supremacy emerged on the back of 
a militaristic triumphalism.  
The fact that after thirty years of war, 
Sri Lankan society is heavily militarized is 
a truism.  As many have documented 
during the 30+ years of conflict the 
military establishment underwent a 
substantial transformation as did the 
ideology of militarism. (Rajasingham- 
Senenayake (2001), De Mel (2007) In the 
immediate aftermath of the victory over 
the LTTE the militarism was pervasive 
and produced gendered and ethnicized post 
war anxieties regarding the country’s 
future, in a toxic cocktail of developments 
among which the emergence of the BBS 
was only one. In their choice of names the 
BBS and similar groups – BoduBalaSena 
or the Army of Buddhist power, 
RavanaBalakaya- The Ravana Brigade, 
(they later called themselves Ravana 
Balaya or the Power of Ravana) are all 
modelled on an understanding that there 
continue to be wars to be fought. The BBS 
in its invocations calls on young Sinhalese 
to become armies and police forces in 
order to save their nation from armed 
Muslim jihadists.  
The Minoritization of women 
As Enloe points out, post-war decisions 
made in relation to anxieties about men 
have profound consequences for women 
(Enloe 219). The BBS rhetoric on 
Muslims, as well as the spinoffs on 
facebook and on different blogs had a 
particular idea of post – war womanhood.  
Sinhala women, for instance were 
understood as being at the vanguard of 
safeguarding the nation from becoming 
minoritized through reproducing the 
necessary number of Sinhala citizens. 
Those refusing their function as vessels of 
procreation, for instance were considered 
to be traitorous to the nation. The 
nationalist representation of Sinhala 
women, where they are considered only in 
relation to their reproductive function, 
where they are compelled to reproduce as 
part of their duty towards the preservation 
of their nation are tropes that have long 
been identified and critiqued in feminist 
literature, in relation to different historical 
moments in Sri Lanka (De Alwis 1998, De 
Mel 2002, Maunaguru 1995).  However, in 
this instance the public coming together of 
misogyny against Sinhala women and the 
violently sexualized othering of the 
Muslims --both men and women--is a 
phenomenon that is peculiar to Sri Lanka’s 
post- war experience, and is fed by 
gendered post war anxieties.   
The following is an excerpt from a 
monks speech at a mass BBS rally in the 
early days of the organization when its 
message seemed to take over the country’s 
imagination and its popularity was 
ascending. In a mass rally held in the town 
of Kandy in March 2013, the BBS monk, 
Ven. Dr. Madegoda Abhayatissa, Senior 
Lecturer at the University of Sri 
Jayawardenapura, Viharadhipathi of the 
Pepiliyana Sunethra Devi Mahaprivena 
invoked women’s dress. He said,  
You know, now with regards to 
their dress, I was telling the 
reverend Gnanasara that he should 
not be talking about women’s 
clothing. But then, who knows who 
is behind that head covering? What 
kind of criminal might be hiding 
there? Let’s say, I get in to this 
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garb? Who will know who is inside? 
Socks on the feet, gloves covering 
the arms, and they walk everywhere. 
Is this the Araabi? (Me 
Araabiyada?) Also how dangerous 
is this? Even I can go in to a 
mosque like that, I can even go into 
the women’s prayer room and you 
know what I can do? I can, I can, 
(monk grins) I am not going to say 
it. (Monk sniggers)6 
The monk in his innuendo is 
suggesting that if he were to wear Muslim 
religious dress – the black Abhaya with 
the niquab--he would be able to enter 
female spaces and commit sexual violene 
against Muslim women gathered there.  
Not only is there a defiling of the sanctity 
of the prayer room in the monks suggested 
actions, Muslim women are reduced to 
objects that can be thus abused presumably 
without significant consequences.  
The fact that the monk can, on the 
public podium, while speaking to an 
audience in the several thousands, casually 
reference sexual violence is an issue worth 
considering. I also argue that the monk’s 
rhetoric is directed at a male audience who 
will understand what is being said, 
suggested or proposed, and additionally, 
that the listening women, need not and 
should not be offended by such rhetoric.  
One reading could be that the reference 
was to violence against Muslim women, 
and therefore Sinhala women need not and 
would not identify with this “other.”   I 
contend, however, that it illustrates the 
absence of any critique of sexual violence 
within popular Sri Lankan discourses 
about women during the Rajapaksa years.  
                                                
6 Available online at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=inZa_HEbD8Q 
Arguably, the militaristic masculinity that 
was acceptable during that time endorsed 
such sexual violence, or at least, speech 
invoking such violence.  I contend that the 
monks words, addressing men in a context 
where women are arguably the larger 
audience erases the presence of Sinhala 
women. The complete erasure of both 
minority Muslim men and women and 
Sinhala Buddhist women in the monk’s 
rhetoric is perhaps the most apt indication 
of the state of both ethnic and gender 
relations in Sri Lanka during the 
immediate post-war era.  
Then, the added issue of the rules of 
vinaya or discipline required of a monk 
becomes a question.7 There is another 
paper to be written regarding the 
sexualization of monks’ rhetoric in 
relation to “other” women. The manner in 
which Burmese monk Ashin Wirathu 
called the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights in Myanmar, Yanghee Lee  
a “whore” for stating that the proposed 
“Race protection laws” may violate 
Human Rights norms constitutes one more 
example.8  
Further, the specificity of the critique 
of the niqab in this context is important. 
The critique of Muslim women’s dress 
here, emerges from a nationalism laced 
with misogyny and should not be conflated 
with any critical feminist discourses that 
also looks at the niqab as problematic. For 
                                                
7 This issue has been explored in relation to monks 
and their political participation. See S. J. Tambiah 
and H. L. Seneviratne.  
8 Gianluca Mezzofiore, Myanmar extremist 
Buddhist monk Wirathu calls UN envoy a whore. 
International Business times January 19th 2015.  
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/myanmar-extremist-
buddhist-monk-wirathu-calls-un-envoy-whore-
1484104 accessed on 17th July 2015. 
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the monk what is of importance is that the 
niqab invokes  “Araabiya,” and that it is 
not local.9 The monk’s preoccupation with 
the dress was purely in keeping with its 
putative strangeness and “difference” 
within the Sri Lankan context.   
The monk’s rhetoric renders both 
women and minorities silent and irrelevant 
other than as subjects of Sinhala masculine 
address.  The Muslims about whom much 
was being said in the hate rhetoric had no 
means of intervening and their perspective 
was absent for all intents and purposes.  
There were no attempts at consultation, 
and no participation of Muslims in these 
public conversations about Muslims 
throughout Sinhala speaking Sri Lanka 
over a period of two years. While there 
were a few token TV debates between 
Sinhala speaking Muslims and BBS 
monks they were framed in ways that the 
Muslim perspective was either lost or 
further marginalized.10 
In the same way the monks speech, 
and the anti Muslim rhetoric was laced 
with sexual violence and misogyny 
irrespective of the fact that women were 
members of the audience and are known to 
be greater dayakas of temples.  There is no 
awareness that all women might be 
disturbed at the suggestion of sexual 
                                                
9 Other interlocutors have also made this same 
critique—for instance, Mrs. Jezima Ismail 
educationist and activist stalwart of the Muslim 
community criticizing the hijab during its early 
introduction, often stated that the practice is 
middle-eastern and therefore alien to the south 
Asian context that has had its own modes of 
covering. See also McGilvray (2008) and Haniffa 
(2005) on the evolution of the hijab and Muslim 
women’s dress in Sri Lanka.  
10 There were a few exceptions. Ya TV coverage 
over TNL station and one conversation with 
gnanasara on derana are noteworthy 
violence, or that Sinhala women may feel 
some solidarity with Muslim women, or 
that Sinhala women might take exception 
to the monk virtually normalizing a crime 
against women. The Ven. Madegoda 
Abhayatissa’s sniggering reference to 
sexually abusing Muslim women in prayer 
rooms assumed an audience of men (who 
endorse sexual violence) where women 
though present-- possibly in larger 
numbers than men-- were irrelevant as 
interlocutors. 
Anxieties regarding the minoritization of 
the majority 
The other related issue around which the 
conversation regarding Muslims became 
heated is the issue of population. The 
preoccupation with numbers has informed 
much of Sri Lanka’s engagement with 
democracy. Many have discussed the 
manner in which the Sinhalese claim to 
supremacy under modern conditions 
depends on the fact of number and is based 
mainly on the Sinhalese “community” 
called in to being as a majority.  The 
ethical basis for Sinhala nationalist claims 
against the Tamils for instance, is the 
claim of number: majority rules 
(Uyangoda 2001). The Sinhalese 
Buddhists populace, therefore recognizes 
the significance of being less than the 
majority. Therefore, the “rabble rousing” 
appeal of the idea that the Sinhalese would 
no longer be a majority is substantial. 
Let me describe two posts from the 
now deactivated Sorry.com Facebook 
page. The first carries a picture of the aged 
monk the Ven. Aggamaha Panditha 
Athipoojya Dawuldena Gnanissara, the 
head of the Amarapura sect.  It also 
features a hand holding a noose. The text 
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attributed to the Ven. monk reads—during 
the time of the Portuguese11 the Sinhala 
Buddhist population of this country was 
98%. Today the percentage has dropped to 
60% and in 2040 the population will drop 
to 40%.  “A small family is golden they 
said. The politicians must take 
responsibility for this.”  At the end of the 
slide it states – “PunchiPavulaRaththaran, 
Kaapu Lanuwa Istharam.” The small 
family is golden they said—how skillfully 
were we misled!12 
The next image states that there are 
12,000 Jihadists trained in the East, and 
that there is a global conspiracy to make 
Sri lanka a Muslim land by 2040. The 
visual carries an image of the national 
identity card with a niqab clad woman’s 
face on it. As I have pointed out, 
elsewhere, there is a clear coordination of 
information within the various fora where 
the hate rhetoric appears and naming the 
year 2040as the moment of change 
remains constant (Haniffa 2015).  
The two slides bring together two sets 
of anxieties: the Sinhalese being duped 
into turning themselves in to a minority, 
and the Muslims – armed jihadists, waiting 
to take over through violence if necessary 
– the majority status in 2040. The face of 
the niqab clad woman “the gonibilla” is 
important. It is the Muslim woman, but as 
stated earlier it is also the scary figure of 
Sinhala children’s stories and the 
despicable and dangerous figure that 
points out “traitors” to be killed off during 
the Bhishanaya or the Time of Terror of 
                                                
11 The Portuguese arrived in Sri Lanka in 1505 and 
stayed until they were ousted by the Dutch some 
150 years later.  
12The PunchiPavulaRaththaran campaign was a 
population control initiative from the 1960s.  
1988-89. The rhetorical othering of the 
Muslims through the gonibilla figure is 
specific to the Sri Lankan context, and is 
emblematic of the intensity of the Sinhala 
anxiety caused by this particular brand of 
otherness. The fact that the Muslims who 
embrace this practice are not self-
conscious about the nature of the self-
othering practice that they are participating 
in, that they are unaware of the manner in 
which the niqab may resemble the 
gonibilla, and that they have no frame of 
reference through which to realize its 
import is telling of the gulf that exists 
between communities.  
The monks had an elaborately worked 
out logic through which they represented 
the manner in which this minoritizing of 
Buddhists will take place.13 The monk 
stated that, of the Sinhala Buddhist 
population, a majority is over the age of 40 
and no longer able to bear children. Of the 
remainder, another half is men. Of the 
group of women of childbearing age, a 
significant percentage has been persuaded 
by NGOs to engage in permanent birth 
control and therefore cannot have any 
more children. Therefore according to 
their calculation, the remainder constitutes 
just one million Sinhala Buddhist women 
who are capable of having children. At the 
present rate of population increase, if they 
even have three children each (which most 
will not) it will not be possible to replace 
the aging population. Therefore, a large 
section of the current Sinhala Buddhist 
population will be dead by 2040 and will 
not be replaced and thereby, the Sinhala 
                                                
13 The following is drawn mainly from the 
presentation made by Ven. Madegoda Abhayatissa 
Thero at the BBS Kandy meeting on 17th March 
2013. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=inZa_HEbD8Q 
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Buddhists will lose their majority status in 
the country.  The monk emphasized the 
need for young people to save Sinhalaness 
through having children. 
The Muslims, according to the Ven. 
Madegoda Abhayatissa Thero, have many 
more than three children. In Muslim 
households, the grandmother, the 
granddaughter and the mother, the monk 
states, are all pregnant at the same time. 
He stated further “If you see a Muslim 
woman she will have one child in the hand 
one in the stomach and a whole line of 
them following her.”14 This fecundity of 
the Muslim family is referred to in 
derogatory terms by Buddhist monks on a 
regular basis.15 
                                                
14 This rhetoric of the fecund Muslim males and the 
constantly pregnant female appears again and again 
in various fora.  Professor Nur Yalman was in Sri 
Lanka in Mid February 2013. He gave an 
interesting talk about his time in Sri Lanka in the 
1960s when he wrote the book Under the Bo Tree 
and the changes that have come about. He made 
some veiled allusions to the anti minority sentiment 
rampant in the country and commented that it was a 
good opportunity for Sri Lanka, at the end of the 
war to draw from the values of true Buddhism. He 
also stated that he found the Sinhalese to be a 
gentle people and that their sensibility was ideally 
suited to a multi-ethnic polity.   A member of the 
learned audience asked a question of the professor- 
and the question was this: “As a Buddhist, 
Buddhism teaches me to respect others. However, 
this is a small country and it can only support a 
limited population. But one community, claiming 
that it is their religious belief, are refusing to 
practice birth control and are engaged in increasing 
the population.  What can we as Buddhists do 
about this?” I read this comment as a reference to 
Muslims and their supposed non-practicing of birth 
control. (notes from Nur Yalman talk) 
15 See for instance the manner in which the Ven. 
Gnanasara listing Muslims’ abilities at an interview 
on the TV channel Youn Asia Television available 
at http://modernvdo.com/UVJiTHNEemZ4bHMz. 
He states that Muslims ability in trade and in 
“making children” 
(Muslimayadaruwohadannadakshay) should be 
valorized as an asset to the country.  Also see the 
Within this discourse, large and visible 
Muslim groups are seen as over sized 
“nuclear families” whose numbers will 
contribute towards them taking over from 
the Sinhalese as the majority. Muslim 
othering also involves the overt 
sexualization of the predatory Muslim 
male.  References to the sexuality and 
fecundity of Muslim women --that they are 
constantly pregnant, that age is no barrier 
to Muslim women’s pregnancy-- is also a 
reference to the rampant sexuality, of 
Muslim males. The monk’s claim about 
mothers, grandmothers and daughters all 
being pregnant at the same time, is a claim 
that Muslim men of whatever age are 
sexually potent and Muslim women of all 
ages are sexually active and engaged in the 
process of reproduction. The Facebook 
pages and monk’s rhetoric against No 
Limit and later Fashion Bug were also 
couched in sexualized terms.  For instance, 
one Facebook post, calling for Sinhalese to 
not patronize Muslim owned clothing 
stores, referred to Muslim men fixing 
cameras in women’s changing rooms.  The 
post said “dear women, please be careful.” 
(kanthavanipraveshamvanna) the next line 
read “share for the sake of your mother, 
sister, female friend, or girl friend.”  The 
post is addressed to men to look after their 
women. In the BBS Kandy meeting of 
March 2012, the Rev. Gnanasara read out 
names of Sinhala women who had worked 
at the Muslim owned clothing stores, 
converted to Islam and in certain instances, 
married Muslim men.  The Ven. 
Gnanasara shouted with reference to the 
clothing chains “can we let them create 
                                                                    
comment on Muslim fecundity by the chief monk 
of the Deegavapi temple quoted in Emannuel. 
(2015) 
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harems like this?” And concluded by 
saying “hereafter we will not send our 
daughters to work there. We will only send 
our sons!” Here the venerable Gnanasara 
is making claims not just about the overt 
sexuality of Muslim men but that Sinhala 
women cannot make choices about sexual 
partners outside of the Sinhala Buddhist 
community. And further, by asserting that 
it is Muslim men that are creating the 
harems, he is also saying that Sinhala 
women are the victims of the predatory 
sexuality of Muslim men and have no 
agency of their own. Another comment 
worth making is that there is no rejection 
of the Muslims’ place in the economy. 
Sinhalese will work with them but only 
male Sinhalese.16  
                                                
16 In the case of Hindutva in India too the 
sexualization of the Muslim other is a trope that has 
received much comment.  In this case too there is a 
fear of Muslim sexuality and fecundity articulated 
as that of a minority overtaking the majority. 
(Menon 2005, Sarkar, 2002). Sarkar writing in the 
aftermath of the anti Muslim violence in Gujarat 
which led to the brutal and targeted rape and killing 
of Muslim women and children describes the 
possible mentality behind the frenzy of violence as 
something that had been cultivated by active 
ideology and politics. There is a revenge narrative 
for past wrongs – Muslim abductions of Hindu 
women-- that were resuscitated by alleged 
contemporary wrongs, the rape and cutting off of 
the breasts of Hindu women in the train in Godhra -
--that led to the frenzy of violence, Sarkar suggests. 
She also suggests that there is a prevailing sexual 
obsession about allegedly ultra virile Muslim male 
bodies and over fertile Muslim female ones that 
inspire and sustain the figures of paranoia and 
revenge (Sarkar 2002. p2874). It must be 
acknowledged that the violence against Muslims in 
Sri Lanka is in no way comparable to occurances in 
India.  But given the history of sexual violence 
against Tamil women during and after the conflict, 
and the BBS’s call for allegiance with the BJP such 
violence continues to be within the realm of the 
possible in Sri Lanka as well.   
 
The Muslim Response: Responses from 
male Muslims constituted a gendered 
discourse similar to that of the Buddhist 
monks.  
Mansur Dahlan a community 
spokesperson, a member of the advisory 
board of the All Ceylon Jamiathul Ulema 
(ACJU), was a rare breed, a Muslim elder 
who actually could hold his own in a 
debate in the Sinhala language. In a TV 
interview with the local YA TV, Dahlan 
also invoked the same Punchi Pawula 
Raththaran government initiative when 
discussing the issue of population.17 He 
stated to the interviewer, “the falling 
Sinhala population is not the problem of 
the Muslims. Look at the number of 
abortion clinics that are opening up,” he 
said. “Muslim women don’t patronize 
those. They are mainly used by Sinhala 
women. If an incentive was offered to the 
Sinhala women to have more children 
rather than offer an incentive for birth 
control, then this problem can be solved.”  
It is here that he mentions the family 
planning/population control drive that 
provided incentives for women to have 
less children. Even to-date doctors 
routinely provide family planning advice 
and the choice of permanent 
contraceptives to women after their third 
pregnancy. Dahlan too then echoes the 
monks and reproduces the prevailing 
stereotypes regarding Muslim fecundity. 
Muslim women perform their reproductive 
role satisfactorily, according to Dahlan. 
The solution to the monks’ perceived 
                                                
17 Muslimhalalanyagamikayantaharamda? 
https://vimeo.com/59737224. Featured on TNL TV 
channel on 21.02.2013 
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problem lies in getting Sinhala women to 
reproduce as efficiently.18 
During this time an email was 
circulated in the form of two graphics 
ostensibly from a Muslims perspective.19 
One was entitled Why is my niqab your 
problem? Done with a combination of 
Sinhala and English text, the graphic 
featured visuals of a niqab clad Muslim 
woman with a speech bubble indicating 
that what was represented in the graphic 
                                                
18 Dahlan was claiming to speak for two million 
Muslims. And a gyneacologist writing to the 
Ravaya newspaper in fact claimed that Muslim 
choices of reproductive technologies often were 
similar to those of others of their class background.  
19 This email was forwarded to me by a female 
feminist mentor, and a Muslim friend and 
colleague with whom I had done much work on the 
anti Muslim sentiment. I have since then found it 
featured on the following website 
http://jaffnamuslim.siteblogs.net/2014/12/06/why-
my-niqab-is-your-problem/. (Only the first poster, 
the second that invokes sexual violence is not 
shown.) I am not aware of the reach of the email or 
the extent of its circulation. I use it because it 
reflects sentiment I often heard repeated by Muslim 
males. Muslim male positions on the hijab are 
rarely informed by a feminist understanding of the 
issue. See for instance veteran Muslim journalist 
Latheef Farook’s article “Does Hijab prevent social 
development” available at 
http://www.dailynews.lk/?q=features/does-hijab-
prevent-social-development. In this article Farook 
claims that those who are “impressed with modern 
civilization” claim that “Hijab is an obstacle that 
prevents women from progressing in the spheres of 
personal and social development.” Questioning the 
sentiments of such persons Farook states further 
that such people “wish that women became an item 
to be traded in the market of immorality. They 
want to rid women of their chastity and 
bashfulness, and wish that their thinking and 
objectives becomes Westernised. Their desire is 
that women become experts in singing, dancing 
and acting. In short, they want the Muslim woman 
to be devoid of faith, belief, purity, morals and 
chastity.” It is unlikely that many women who wear 
the hijab will identify with the writer’s invocation 
of “chastity and bashfulness.”  Such a reductive 
understanding of women’s lives and roles informs 
male interventions into discourses on women in Sri 
Lanka.  
was her perspective. The graphic, done in 
the form of a poster has a line of text at the 
top stating that many religions prescribed a 
form of modest dress for women. A visual 
below that depicted a group of smiling 
women with different sorts of head 
coverings categorized as Christian-
catholic, Orthodox Jewish, Muslim, and 
Sabran.20  The visual was followed by text 
stating that both Buddhism and ancient 
Sinhala texts urge women to be modest. 
This text is followed by a quotation from 
an unnamed Sinhala literary source about 
how a woman should cover her body, not 
smile too broadly, and not leave the house 
without permission from her mate.  The 
niquab clad woman’s speech bubble states: 
“why then is my dress that is so modest 
considered to be alien to our culture? Is it 
not the types of dress below that are 
unsuitable for our culture? The next 
illustration contains a line of women in 
tight pants, short skirts, midriff baring 
outfits and low cut tops.  Then why is my 
niquab a problem for you?”   
The second poster/leaflet referred 
explicitly to sexual violence.  Invoking the 
high incidences of sexual violence in the 
country—with a citation from a women’s 
group’s March 8th message—it stated,  
for sure the blame for these 
incidents should be placed entirely 
at the hands of the perpetrator. 
However, women who incited these 
men by walking around half-naked 
should also bare some amount of 
responsibility.  In the same way as 
we lock our windows and bolt our 
doors against thieves and criminals 
                                                
20 It is not clear what the term Sabran featured in 
the graphic refers to.  It is a town in France and the 
reference could be to medieval European women’s 
dress.  
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in the night, in the same way that 
drivers wear helmets and put on seat 
belts, women too when they wear 
modest clothing receive a measure 
of protection. That is why every 
religion calls upon women to wear 
modest (sheelachara) dress. 
Next to the text there is a visual 
entitled “a simple theory” – there are two 
photographs – one of a lollipop with a 
wrapper on and one with the wrapper off.  
In the first there is a fly moving away from 
the sweet. In the second the lollipop is 
covered with flies! 
The next illustration further endorses 
the idea of the lecherous male.  There is a 
woman in a bikini and sunglasses walking; 
she is being followed by a man with his 
pants down revealing his buttocks.  There 
is a woman who is walking in the opposite 
direction dressed in the niqab to whom the 
man pays no attention. The speech bubble 
over the woman in the bikini says “I am 
minding my own business, why is he 
following me?” The niqab clad women 
looks on as she walks away and states – 
“thank goodness I was saved by my 
clothing!”21The Hijabi’s speech bubble at 
the bottom of the page states in Sinhala-  
We are not casting aspersions on 
anyone’s choice of dress.  Every 
woman has the right to dress the 
way she wants. In the same way, 
                                                
21 This particular graphic is culled from one that 
was in circulation internationally on facebook and a 
variety of other websites. The original features only 
the two women --one clad in niqab and the other in 
a bikini and sunglasses. In the original the bikini 
clad woman’s speech bubble states – “only the eyes 
are shown, everything else is covered -how 
oppressed!”  And the niqab clad woman states – 
“only the eyes are covered, everything else is 
shown, how oppressed!” 
http://www.democraticunderground.com/10026022
609 
don’t we too have the right to dress 
in our religious dress in order to 
ensure our security? Why is my 
niqab your problem? 
The two graphics subscribe to an 
understanding of women’s roles and social 
worth that is similar to the monk’s 
discourse, but also reflects a widely held 
justification among Muslims in the south 
Asian region and elsewhere for Muslim 
women’s veiling practices.  The first 
graphic extolling the virtues of Muslim 
women’s dress, reworks the age old trope 
of asking women to practice modest dress 
or be subjected to a predatory male gaze 
and the inevitability of sexual violence.  
The second graphic is explicit in making a 
connection between sexual violence and 
dress. It is also produced from an 
imagination that cannot comprehend 
solidarity among women. The possibility 
that the Muslim woman might be incensed 
enough by the prospect of sexual violence 
against a fellow human being to intervene 
to stop such violence is not permitted by 
the visual.   
While the poster depicts women’s 
bodies only as objects of male desire, the 
graphic also depicts men as flies – unclean 
and polluting, and unable to control 
themselves in the presence of a woman’s 
body if not for the concealing and 
obstructing barriers of clothing.  The 
normalization of sexual violence through 
the depiction of males as predatory and out 
of control and similar to vermin (flies) 
goes to further regularize violent and 
criminal male sexual behavior as an 
everyday occurrence.  On the one hand 
women are called upon to take measures to 
protect themselves from such male 
predators. On the other hand, according to 
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this logic such a dangerous state of affairs 
can only be avoided through a combative 
and protective “good” masculinity, 
dovetailing well with the combative 
masculinity of militarism that sees women 
as needing protection from predatory 
‘other’ men.22  While Muslim interlocutors 
may not have intended the connection with 
a “saviour” masculinity attributing safety 
exclusively to the hijab and niqab, I argue 
however that the graphic participated and 
drew upon elements of the same 
militaristic discourse that saw women only 
as objects and thereby victims of male 
sexual violence and in need of protection.  
These two graphics were on email 
during the height of the circulation of anti 
Muslim sentiment among the Colombo 
circles that I frequent and the extent to 
which it received wide coverage is not 
clear.  It most probably had a life on social 
media as well.  I have also more recently 
come across social media photographs of 
the lollipop with and without the wrapper 
appearing in Billboards in the middle-east.  
These are generally advertisements 
favouring veiling practices for women. I 
use it here since it referenced a perspective 
that I periodically encountered among 
groups of Muslim men who were 
responding to the crisis.23  And that these 
                                                
22 Such protection from “good” men is also of 
course reserved for “good” women as many 
feminists have pointed out.   
23 Another such instance was the anti BBS monk – 
Watarakke Vijitha thero extolling the virtues of 
Islamic clothing for women as the most modest and 
most civilized dress for women—(vinitha, 
sanwara) since it covers a woman completely. He 
made this statement addressing the Upcountry 
Muslim Council meeting. The statement is 
available on a YouTube video made by an 
organization called Knowledge Box and uploaded 
on 24th August 2013.  
graphics in particular had little to do with 
womens’ experiences was born out almost 
immediately afterwards. At a women’s 
meeting that was organized by the 
Secretariat for Muslims in August 2013 we 
discussed these graphics.  And the 
immediate response of the participating 
women—many of whom wore the hijab 
and some who wore the niqab --was that 
they wear the hijab, niqab or any form of 
Muslim dress not to protect themselves 
from predatory males, but because they 
believe it to be a direct request of Allah 
that appears in the Quran.24 
I received this email from a male 
colleague who was very involved with the 
activism against the BBS.  He forwarded it 
                                                                    
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbV3QUaWlL
Q 
24 During field-work that I conducted a decade ago 
women were less shy about stating that they 
covered in order to ensure that men were not 
tempted by women’s beauty. (Haniffa 2005a) With 
regards to the Quran’s statements regarding 
modesty Leila Ahmad claims that there is no direct 
injunction in the Quran regarding veiling. The 
practice was prevalent during the time of the 
prophet Muhammad in many parts of the world 
including Arabia and was probably an elite 
practice. Within the young Muslim community 
veiling and seclusion became a norm only for the 
prophet’s wives. In the Hadith or the practices of 
the prophet, the use of the phrase “she took to the 
veil” to indicate that “she became the wife of the 
prophet” suggests that even after Muhammad’s 
death the practice was not common amongst 
Muslims. The Quran (Yusuf Ali translation) states: 
“Say to the believing men that they should lower 
their gaze and guard their modesty: that will make 
for greater purity for them: and God is well 
acquainted with all that they do.” 24:31 And say to 
the believing women that they should lower their 
gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not 
display their beauty and ornaments except what 
must ordinarily appear thereof; that they should 
draw their veils over their bosoms and not display 
their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, 
their sons, their husbands sons, their brothers or 
their brothers sons ....  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to me as an example of a good response 
that we could use in our anti BBS work. 
He could not quite understand my 
opposition to the images and rhetoric. He 
thought it was a well-formulated response 
to the BBS.  Positing that most men see 
women only as sex objects, that women 
should constantly be vigilant against 
sexual assault, that women are responsible 
for their protection from sexual assault, 
that sexual assault occurs because of 
women’s dress, that women are only 
objects of male pleasure (like a lollipop) 
that men are vermin (flies) that are 
attracted to any and every female were all 
ideas propagated by the set of graphics. 
They did not seem to be thought of as 
problematic by this friend or many other s 
among whom the graphics were shared.  I 
am arguing here that misogynist ideas that 
were prevalent within the Sri Lankan 
public sphere and given public expression 
under the Rajapaksha regime were part of 
a fairly widespread male cultural ethos in 
Sri Lanka that crossed ethno religious 
allegiances.  Therefore the prevalence of 
predatory male sexuality, and a culture of 
male sexual violence against which 
women needed to protect themselves were 
truisms about Sri Lankan society even for 
my Muslim activist male friend. 
Therefore, the graphic depicting women as 
lollies and men as flies reflected a social 
reality, and arguing that hijab provided 
protection for women from predatory male 
sexuality was an ideal even progressive 
defense of the hijab! 
I have argued elsewhere that gender 
relations within the Muslim community 
were inevitably inflected by Muslims’ 
minority consciousness. I argued that the 
performance of segregated male and 
female spaces and the hierarchization of 
male female relations among Muslims 
were important and were impacted by the 
non- endorsement, dismissal and 
demonization of Muslim masculinity in a 
multi religious and plural Sri Lankan 
public sphere. Maintaining strict gender 
hierarchies in the homes of middle class 
Muslims that I worked with, then, was 
important.  Individual Muslims perform 
hierarchized gender relations in Muslim 
identified settings far more intensely, and 
with greater commitment than they do in 
more multi religious settings.  While for 
some this performance was meaningful in 
one set of social interactions with little 
relevance in many others, for many it was 
performative in that it spawned greater 
restrictions for women regarding dress 
choice, freedom of movement, access to 
education, and strictures to practice their 
religion in particular ways. (Butler 1990) 
It is often this internalization of gender 
hierarchies that renders such discourses 
about dress, safety, and also ideas of 
predatory males meaningful.  
The Rajapaksa years saw a coming 
together of gender relations inflected by 
post-war militarism as well as those 
formed by a generation of minority 
consciousness exacerbated by the strained 
ethnic relations of the conflict years. 
However, the response by activists in Sri 
Lanka to the assertion of these very 
gendered positions was also somewhat 
hesitant and muted.  
Let me end this section with one other 
example of the gendered and sexualized 
nature of this discourse about hijab. I was 
forwarded an email by a male friend which 
many told me later was circulated widely 
via many of Colombo’s old boys networks 
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that share images that might be termed soft 
porn. The photos were paparazzi shots of a 
voluptuous young woman – obviously 
wealthy and well dressed in revealing and 
flattering clothing.  She was shown 
entering and leaving various venues and in 
one shot waving to a photographer. She 
was uniformly attired in low cut or strappy 
short dresses and high heels.   After a 
series of images of this young woman the 
final slide states.  
Halal certified.  
Who is she? 
Princess Reem Al Waleed bin Talal 
of Saudi Arabia. 
No Burqa for her!! 
… If she was in a Burqa, you would 
not have received this … Be 
thankful for small mercies! 
The middle class men consuming 
images of this young woman’s body via 
social media were calling attention to 
Muslim hypocrisy by presenting the Saudi 
princess’ non- hijab clad body as an 
“uncovered” Muslim female body.  They 
were also asserting their own right to look 
at women’s bodies for pleasure and 
celebrate the media’s circulation of images 
of scantily clad and sexualized women 
thinly disguised as icons of female wealth 
and success.  I draw attention to this set of 
images to illustrate once again the 
prevailing sexist and sexualized 
mainstream middle class culture in Sri 
Lanka which also drew from and 
participated in the anti Muslim sentiment 
in circulation at that time.   
So what?  
I have argued so far, that the Militarism 
that pervaded Sri Lanka’s social and 
political worlds in the aftermath of May 
2009 (when the war against the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam officially ended) 
influenced post-war nationalism and 
brought about a recalibration of gender 
orders within the country. I am arguing 
further that the Sinhala supremacist 
nationalist hate rhetoric against Muslims 
drew from and was formed by this 
discourse of militarism and for the 
purposes of this paper I have illustrated the 
gendered nature of the thus influenced 
rhetoric. I have also demonstrated the 
striking similarity between the BBS 
assertions and the Muslim response – both 
representing communal sensibilities that 
saw women as owned by the collective 
and defined by their sexuality and 
reproductive capacity.  
I want to end with some speculation 
regarding what this means for women’s 
solidarity and women organizing. As I 
have indicated in the analyses of both the 
Buddhist and Muslim rhetoric in relation 
to anti Muslim sentiment, both have little 
space for entertaining ideas of women’s 
solidarity. The dated stereotypes that were 
mobilized by the Minister of women’s 
affairs of the Rajapaksha regime for 
instance indicated that women were 
incapable of such solidarity. The 
Honorable minister, Tissa Karaliyadda, 
once stated: 
Even though we have paid special 
attention to the protection of 
women’s rights, when a woman is 
given authority in a department or a 
ministry they tend to suppress other 
women (who) are under their 
administration out of jealousy. This 
situation will lead to inefficiency in 
that particular organization. Hence 
always the main chair should be 
given to a male and the assistant 
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should be a female' the Minister 
said.25 
The stereotypes regarding women that 
are mobilized by both Muslim and 
Buddhist sets of representations and by 
representatives of the state are curious in 
their celebration of archaic, obsolete and 
outmoded ideals about women and speak 
to the structural maintenance of gender 
hierarchies in what many Sri Lankans self 
identify as the south Asian country with 
the greatest freedom for women. The 
stereotypes seem to persist in an economy 
liberalized since the 1970s where many 
women are integrated in to the labour 
force, and are also compelled to participate 
economically in the informal sector.  As 
others have pointed out women in the 
garment sector, the plantations and those 
who work as migrant labour form the base 
of the Sri Lankan economy. Women also 
have leadership positions in many 
professions and professional bodies, and 
the country’s (male) diplomats often boast 
of having the worlds first ever woman 
prime minister and later, a woman 
president.  Women constitute a majority of 
university educated youth.26 Every 
                                                
25http://www.mirror.lk/news/5843-a-male-should-
always-be-the-chairperson. Of course there was 
serious opposition to this from women activists and 
a statement was issues. But to no avail. The 
Minister of Child Development and Women's 
Affairs, Mr. Tissa Karaliyadda was recently quoted 
as saying that the concept of Gender Equality was 
meaningless, and that women activists who were 
advocating such ideas were a small minority who 
had rejected the values of pathivatha (fidelity to 
husbands). The interview was aired on the Sirasa 
TV channel on 15th November 2013.  
26 In the 2012=2013 academic year alone out of  
total of 24198 admitted to the universities 14853 




professional category in the country 
includes women and Sri Lanka boasts of 
the second highest ranking for the region 
in the Global Gender Gap index (at 79 out 
of 142, ten rankings behind Bangladesh 
who are ranked at 68).27  
Several years in to the emergence and 
spread of organized anti Muslim sentiment 
in the country, there has been no 
substantive coming together of a strong 
women’s voice in either the critique of the 
Bodu Bala Sena rhetoric or to question the 
very reductive response from Muslim 
interlocutors. Those who have looked at 
the issue with even a partially gendered 
lens have done so in ethnically specific 
terms. Chulani Kodikara’s excellent piece 
calls attention to the BBS making 
statements about Sinhala women’s 
fertility, and Qadri Ismail has pointed out 
the many problems that arise in instances 
where Muslim men police the actions of  
Muslim women.28 Neither calls attention 
to the fact that the BBS and the Muslim 
male discourse reflects derogatory ideas 
regarding women in general and are not 
                                                
27 As many have pointed out, however, the political 
participation of women remains abysmal at less 
than 5% in parliament and even lower in local 
government.  This brings down Sri Lankas ranking 
in these indexes. The story about how women’s 
lack of representation in parliament leads to but 
also stems from the prevalence of such gender 
stereotypes, and the manner in which it indexes a 
structural problem in the Sri Lankan society 
remains to be written. 
28 Ismail’s intervention is problematic in that he 
attributes women’s dress only to male policing and 
renders any choice that women may exercise in 
practicing Islamic dress absent in his discussion. 
His analysis does not reference the immense 
literature on women’s dress transformation either 
in Sri Lanka or elsewhere and speaks to a very 
problematic and reductive putatively ethical 
position on gender relations in Muslim 
communities embraced by many academics in Sri 
Lanka.    
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specific to Sinhala or Muslim women 
alone.  
Another issue that haunts the lack of 
feminist organizing around the BBS 
despite its very clearly gendered rhetoric is 
most active Sri Lankan feminists’ mistrust 
of the hijab. Since the 1980s Muslim 
women’s practice of the hijab has become 
institutionalized in the country.  Hijabs are 
distributed by the state as part of the 
Muslim government school uniform. 
However, many women’s activists, from 
the Muslim community and from other 
communities, are not convinced as to the 
nature of the “choice” that informs Muslim 
women’s adoption of the dress and the 
difference from other women that Muslim 
women are thereby asserting (Haniffa 
2005, Mahmood 2006, Haniffa 2008).  
While the hijab and niqab have both been 
practices that became common in the 
1980s the niqab is arguably more prevalent 
today with many niqab clad women 
pursuing university education and public 
roles while maintaining their face cover.  
The piety movement led transformation 
experienced by Sri Lankan Muslims 
during the conflict years has not been 
effectively communicated to ethnic and 
religious others and many stereotypes 
abound. One of my feminist friends once 
told me that “the BBS are ok with the 
traditional Muslims. They are only against 
the fundamentalists.” This feminist 
activist’s remark invoking both 
problematic terms “traditional Muslim” 
and “fundamentalist” are part of a larger 
vocabulary shared by local civil society 
that includes the uncritical use of the term 
“radicalization.”  Such terms underscore 
the manner in which local discourses 
“know” the reality of Muslims in Sri 
Lanka—nearly two million strong-- many 
of whom have committed to the self-
transformation promised by the Islamic 
piety movement.  The hijab-clad woman 
personifies this transformed Muslim 
community known through the above 
terms – radicalized, fundamentalist and so 
on. The failure of Sri Lanka’s  
“progressive” community including 
feminists, has been their inability to 
perceive these Muslim women’s concerns 
and address them collectively.29 
What is crucial about the post war 
moment in the country is the manner in 
which the latent racism and misogyny 
within Sri Lankan society found public 
endorsement by Sinhala society’s icons of 
authority—the sangha and the political 
leadership. This leadership claimed to 
speak about both women and minorities 
without letting representatives of either 
group on the podium. The minority 
Muslim response has been to seek 
common cause with the monk’s rhetoric 
through endorsing the monks’ positions on 
women. The result is a complete erasure of 
women’s perspectives.  
Women’s speech in the public 
sphere—where women articulate political 
                                                
29 There have been local non- Muslim activists who 
have engaged with Muslim communities and 
participated in programs seeking to address Muslim 
concerns during the years when the BBS was at its 
most active. However, they have been in the 
minority and much of the work of documentation, 
engagement with the state and human rights 
activism has been carried out by Muslim activists. 
The issue of Muslim women has come up rarely 
other than in the ways outlined in this paper.  When 
the BBS popularity was at its height, many Muslim 
women dressed in black were fearful of venturing 
out in public. At this point the Muslim Council 
distributed pastel colored hijabs in exchange for the 
black. One Muslim feminist was not happy with 
this effort as it further institutionalized the hijab.  
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moral or ethical positions common to all—
remains absented by this discourse. The 
complete dominance of nationalist public 
discourse by men with the assumption that 
they speak for all has silenced women 
institutionally and politically. The women 
that attempt to speak--either in support of 
or against this discourse--face enormous 
obstacles not only to speak but to be heard.  
As Kodikara has argued, the nationalist 
preoccupations of the Rajapaksha regime 
resulted in a roll back of progressive 
legislation favouring women. (Kodikara 
2014) 
The presidential elections of 2015 
where Maitrhipala Sirisena defeated the 
incumbent were a resounding rejection of 
the Rajapaksa regime. The critique 
mounted against the regime, however, was 
against the rampant corruption and 
nepotism of the Rajapaksa family and not 
primarily of the ethnicised and gendered 
nature of its politics.  However anti-
Rajapaksa rhetoric during both the 
presidential and general election 
campaigns included references to the fact 
that many in his camp were rapists or had 
a record of sexual violence, or of verbally 
insulting women. It was also claimed that 
it is the bankruptcy of Rajapaksha’s  
political project  that required him to 
continue to incite ethnic hatred. 30 While 
                                                
30 An advertisement for the Sirisena Campaign 
included one where Hirunika Premachandra 
criticizes the manner in which Rajpaksa loyalist 
S.B.Dissanayake called for the parading of an 
unclothed former president Chandrika 
Kumaratunge as an insult to all Sri Lankan women. 
Further JVP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake 
roundly critiqued the Rajapaksa regime’s inability 
to see the war as a devastating period in the 
country’s history that the entire country needed to 
recover from and not as a victory to be celebrated 
endlessly at the expense of reconciliation and 
positive changes to people’s everyday lives.  
the fact that such ideas are circulating in 
the public realm is promising the positive 
articulation of this critique –where 
minorities are and should be placed within 
the Sri Lankan polity, and what the state’s 
position should be on women has not yet 
been made clear.  In this context the news 
that the cabinet has approved the changing 
of legislation to ensure 25% compulsory 
nominations of women for local 
government elections is welcome.31 
The minoritization of women and the 
feminization of minorities that began 
following the military victory over the 
LTTE caused distress to minorities – the 
Tamils in the north and Muslims in the 
south.32  Additionally the discourse—as 
represented by those proposing and 
opposing it-- reduced women to their 
sexual and reproductive roles alone. While 
elements of the previous regime that 
embraced such rhetoric continue to hold 
office there is a clear and public 
articulation of opposition to it.  However, 
regardless of this welcome shift, 
overturning the structural features that 
makes such ideas regarding both women 
and minorities commonsensical in popular 
consciousness is going to take time. 
Women’s incursion into the public 
sphere is being modulated and masculine 
                                                
31 See Lanka Business Online. 30th September 
2015. Sri Lanka to include 25% women in local 




32 I am referring here to the rhetorical othering of 
northern Tamils through the virtual occupation of 
the north by the military and the BBS running loose 
in the south. I do not propose thereby to suggest 
that the Muslims and Tamils are localized to the 
north and the south or that there are no Tamils in 
the south or Muslims in the north.  
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hegemony of sorts is maintained through 
utilizing a constant, repeated and frenzied 
rhetoric of women’s sexualized and 
domestic place in the world (Chatterjee).  
And this is true not just of the anxious 
assertion of post-war Sinhala nationalism 
but of the equally anxious defensive 
response from Muslim representatives.  
Due to the prevalence of such ideas 
Muslim women find it difficult to break 
into the annals of community decision-
making either through politics or through 
leadership positions among the ulema.  
While there are hundreds of Muslim 
women lawyers, at least one prominent 
magistrate and a very powerful assistant 
attorney general who is a Muslim woman, 
the All Ceylon Jamiathul Ulema (ACJU) 
as gatekeepers of change in community 
religious practice has consistently blocked 
the introduction of women quazis.33  And 
women’s participation in politics in Sri 
Lanka remains the lowest in the South 
Asian region.  
The BBS articulations and the 
responses to them emerge from a 
particular Sri Lankan brand of gender 
relations. Different community 
experiences with regards to gender 
relations must be understood, and are in 
fact necessary for successful political 
interventions. The distinctions of caste, 
class religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation 
and regional location that impact Sri 
Lankan women’s lives in particular ways 
need to be understood as having nuances 
that may not immediately make sense 
within prevailing frameworks.   The point 
of taking account of difference is to then 
understand the manner in which structural 
                                                
33 Those who adjudicate on matters of Muslim 
personal law.  
features that cut across ethnic 
particularities may impact such 
communities differently. It is not to lose 
sight of the possibility of collective action 
to address such differently troubling 
experiences.  
Unfortunately, given the polarizing 
and ghettoizing impact of the conflict, 
much of the analysis about the status of 
women in Sri Lanka has been ethnic 
specific (Haniffa 2005, De Alwis 1998, 
Maunaguru 1995). And further, the 
conflict influenced our categories of 
critical analysis. Social science 
investigations about Muslims, for instance, 
were eclipsed by the urgency to 
understand Sinhala and Tamil nationalism 
and the mechanics of the conflict.  In post 
war, post Rajapaksa Sri Lanka, then, we 
are compelled to ask new questions and 
find new arenas of inquiry to inform both 
our scholarship and our politics. 
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